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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
classes of persons still enjoy a degree of immunity from the con-
sequences of their negligence by virtue of their having trans-
ferred control or ownership of property subsequent to their peril-
creating activity. Thus, under the common law, a lessor is ordi-
narily not responsible for defective premises, 81 and a vendor may,
with impunity to third persons who may foreseeably be injured
by a defective structure, sell an obviously dilapidated and dan-
gerous building. 2 The greater recognition being given to the
principle that a person should be obliged to exercise reasonable
care wherever injury to another is foreseeable suggests that
these and other immunities which are likewise related to the
transfer of control or ownership may be weakened or removed.
Fred W. Ellis
TORTS - DUTY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF OTHERS
Defendant construction company had just completed work on
a section of an Alaskan highway, and traffic was being permitted
in one lane. The company, through its supervisors, knew of the
resentment which its employees held for the highway users, but
in spite of this knowledge the supervisors supplied a group of
off-duty employees with liquor and allowed them to have a job
completion celebration adjacent to the highway. Plaintiffs en-
tered the usable lane of the highway, which was adjacent to prop-
erty occupied by the defendant construction company. There
three of the company's off-duty employees attacked the plain-
tiffs, who brought suit against these off-duty employees, the com-
pany's supervisors, and the construction company. The federal
district court gave judgment for the plaintiffs against the con-
struction company and the off-duty employees, but exonerated
the supervisors after the jury found them not negligent. On
appeal by the construction company, the United States Court of
foresee that the defects will affect subsequent purchasers. See McEachern v.
Plauche Lumber & Construction Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So.2d 405 (1952) ; LA. CIVIL
CoDE art. 2503 (1870).
31. See, e.g., Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal..2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183
(1948) (defendant not liable as lessor for defective railing, but liable as contractor
for having defectively constructed railing eighteen years earlier) ; PROSSER, TORTS
§ 80 (2d ed. 1955).
32. See PROSSER, TORTS § 79 (2d ed. 1955). However, where the danger is
very great to persons outside of the premises, the nuisance theory has been em-
ployed as an exception to the general rule that a vendor is not responsible to a




Appeals, held, judgment for the plaintiffs reversed. The doctrine
of respondeat superior was not applicable inasmuch as the as-
saulting employees were off-duty,' and although the company
owed a duty to use reasonable care to control the construction
workers and would have been liable had its supervisors been
negligent in this regard,2 the jury's finding of no negligence on
the part of the supervisors barred recovery from the company.
Martin v. S. Birch and Sons, 224 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1957).
Generally there is no duty to control the conduct of another
to prevent him from injuring a third party.8 The courts have
recognized exceptions to this rule and have imposed a duty to
control in cases in which a special relation can be found between
the parties4 or because of the occupancy of premises.' Where one
has taken charge of a person, thereby depriving that person of
his means of self protection, there is a duty to use reasonable
care to keep him from being harmed by another as found in
cases in which prison officials have been held liable for failure
to protect one prisoner from another prisoner who is known to
be dangerous.( A duty, arising from undertaking the charge of
1. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 291 (1933) (general rule of master's liability for
torts of servants within the scope of their employment) 2 MECHEM, AGENCY
§§ 1926-1927 (2d ed. 1914) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (1955); SEAVEY, STUDIES IN
AGENCY 433 (1934).
2. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Savoy, 82 So.2d 68 (La. App. 1955) ; Romero v.
Hogue, 77 So.2d 74 (La. App. 1954) Cornell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 8 So.2d 364 (La. App. 1942); Carr v. Win. C. Corwell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652,
171 P.2d 5 (1946) ; Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Ellington, 92 Ga. App. 23, 87
S.E.2d 665 (1955).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § § 192, 315 (1934).
4. Charonnet v. San Francisco School District, 58 Cal. App.2d 246, 133 P.2d
643 (1943) ; McLeod v. Grant County School District No. 128, 43 Wash.2d 316,
255 P.2d 360 (1953) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 137 (1934) ; Harper & Kime, The
Duty To Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1947).
See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 18.7 (1956). It is suggested in
this section that there may exist a relation either between the defendant and the
person who injured the plaintiff or between the defendant and the plaintiff. Ex-
amples of the first relation are those between the owner of a car and the person
to whom he lends his car; parent's relation to his child; and the general employer-
employee relation where the employee is off-duty. The article states that the basis
for liability here should be the practical opportunity for effective control. Examples
of the second relation are cases such as the jailer's relation to his prisoner, and the
owner of land to his licensee or invitee.
5. Fletcher v. Baltimore Ry., 168 U.S. 135 (1897) ; Landry v. News-Star-World
Pub. Co., 46 So.2d 140 (La. App. 1950); Kapphahn v. Martin, 230 Iowa 739,
298 N.W. 901 (1941); Bruner v. Seelbach Hotel, 133 Ky. 41, 117 S.W. 373
(1909) ; Holly v. Meyers Hotel & Tavern, 9 N.J. 493, 89 A.2d 6 (1952) ; Hogle v.
H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910); Ford v. Grand
Union, 197 N.E. 266 (N.Y. App. 1935) ; Brogan v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 29
A.2d 671 (1943) ; Stevens v. Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 496, 198 Atl. 655 (1934);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 317 (1934).
6. St. Jilian v. State, 82 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1955) (plaintiff's son was killed
by paranoid who was put in the same cell with him) ; Honeycutt v. Bass, 187 So.
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dangerous persons, is imposed on custodians of mental institu-
tions to use reasonable care to prevent such persons from injur-
ing others.7 A somewhat similar duty is imposed on the occupier
of land to control persons on his land.8 By allowing persons on
his land to act in a manner which creates a foreseeable risk of
harm to others, he is said to become a participant in the misuse
of his property.9 The occupier is not absolutely liable, but has
only a duty to use reasonable care' ° to control the conduct of
others on his land when he knows or has reason to know" of
the necessity to exercise such control in order to prevent an un-
reasonable risk of harm to others. In conformance with this
principle, occupiers have been held liable for injuries resulting
from authorized games conducted on their property where such
848 (La. App. 1939) (plaintiff put in cell with drunk known to be dangerous) ;
Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935) (sheriff knew of prison-
ers' plan to attack the plaintiff, who was also a prisoner, yet did nothing to stop
it) ; Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918) (sheriff put insane
prisoner with a knife in the cell with the plaintiff) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 320
(1934).
7. University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907)
(officials of university hospital negligently allowed insane patient to escape and
injure plaintiff) ; Jones Co. v. State, 12 Me. 214, 119 AtI. 577 (1923) (defendants
negligently allowed inmate to escape and burn plaintiff's land).
It is interesting to note that generally custodians of prisons are not liable in
the same manner as custodians of mental institutions as the courts have stated
that the purpose of confining a criminal is punishment, not public protection.
Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153 (La. App. 1956). An exception to this rule was
found in Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1956). It was found that because
of the location of a certain area that the prison officials owed the residents of this
area a special duty of protection from escaping prisoners. See Note, 17 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 857 (1957). See also Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Wood, 9 Tex. 223,
66 S.W. 449 (1902) (defendant railroad undertook the charge of a person with
smallpox; he escaped and passengers on the train contracted smallpox).
8. See cases cited note 5 supra.
9. DeRyss v. New York Central R.R., 274 N.Y. 85, 9 N.E.2d 788 (1937) ; Ford
v. Grand Union, 197 N.E. 266 (N.Y. App. 1935).
10. Landry v. News-Star-World Pub. Co., 46 So.2d 140 (La. App. 1950) (de-
fendant, owner of a building, used reasonable care in controlling independent con-
tractor working on his building) ; Harrington v. Border City Mfg. Co., 240 Mass.
170, 132 N.E. 721 (1921) (plaintiff failed to show that the defendant was negli-
gent in his control of persons playing baseball on his premises) ; Holly v. Meyers
Hotel & Tavern, 9 N.J. 493, 89 A.2d 6 (1952) (owner found to have used reason-
able care in controlling drunk sailors occupying a room adjacent to the highway).
11. Kapphahn v. Martin, 230 Iowa 739, 298 N.W: 901 (1941) (defendant had
no reason to know that a woman would knock a screen out of the window in order
to see a parade) ; Bruner v. Leebach Hotel, 133 Ky. 41, 117 S.W. 373 (1909)
(defendant had no reason to know that a man would throw a beer bottle from the
roof of his hotel) ; Ford v. Grand Union, 197 N.E. 266 (N.Y. App. 1935) (em-
ployer had no reason to know his basement was being used as a shooting range and
his manager was held to have left the scope of employment when he went into
the basement to join the shooting) ; Brogan v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 29 A.2d
671 (1943) (defendant had reason to know that boys would play on his property
and cause injury to highway users).
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games created a foreseeable risk of harm to persons not on the
property.12
In the instant case, after finding that the defendant construc-
tion company could not be held liable for the acts of the assault-
ing employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior since
these employees were off-duty, the court recognized the duty of
the defendant company to use reasonable care in controlling per-
sons on its land in order to prevent them from harming highway
users. The company's supervisors were on duty at the time of
the assault, and thus the company would have been liable for
these supervisors' negligence. 13 The supervisors knew that the
employees were drinking and celebrating adjacent to the high-
way. The jury found, however, that the supervisors were not
negligent in controlling these off-duty employees, possibly from
a reluctance to hold them personally liable.14 The jury did at-
tempt to hold the company liable. On appeal the court reversed
the jury's verdict against the company since liability on the part
of the company could be supported only by the negligent acts of
the supervisors, there being no allegation of independent negli-
gence on the part of the company. The finding, as a matter of
fact, that the supervisors were not negligent precluded, as a mat-
ter of law, the company's liability under the majority view'15
although there is a minority view to the contrary.16
12. Salevan v. Wilmington, 45 Del. 290, 72 A.2d 239 (1950) ; Greeson v. lille-
rest Golf Course, 265 N.Y. Supp. 886 (1938) ; Stevens v. Pittsburg, 329 Pa. 496,
198 Atl. 655 (1934) ; Robb v. Milwaukee, 6 N.W.2d 222 (Wis. 1942).
13. See cases cited notes 1 and 2 aupra.
14. The jury may very well have found the supervisors not negligent because
of a reluctance to hold them personally liable. Possibly if the plaintiff had brought
suit against the company alone, the jury would have found the supervisors negli-
gent knowing that they, the supervisors, would not be held personally liable.
15. Brooks v. Birmingham, 239 Ala. 172, 194 So. 525 (1940) (judgment in
favor of one joint tortfeasor does not release the other unless the latter's liability
rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior) ; Southern Ry. v. Nix, 62 Ga.
App. 119, 8 S.E.2d 409 (1940) (court found that theonly possible "proximate
cause" of injury to the plaintiff could have been the negligence of the defendant
railroad's engineer; therefore when the engineer was held to be not negligent, there
was no basis for holding the railroad liable) ; Hall v. Miller, 212 Iowa 835, 235
N.W. 298 (1931) (employee truck driver not negligent; therefore employer was
not liable) ; Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co., 167 Minn. 84, 208 N.W. 546 (1926).
However, if it can be found that the employer was independently negligent a
finding of no negligence on the part of the employee obviously does not affect the
employer's liability. See Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Callahan, 244 Ala. 449,
13 So.2d 660 (1943) ; Pollard v. Coulter, 138 Ala. 421, 191 So. 231 (1939) ; Dillion
v. Harkleroad, 295 Ky. 308, 174 S.W.2d 419 (1943) ; Monumental Motor Tours
Inc. v. Eaton, 184 Va. 311, 35 S.E.2d 105 (1945).
16. O'Brien v. Dade Bros, 18 N.J. 457, 114 A.2d 266 (1953) (in this case the
plaintiff sued the employer and the employee jointly. The jury in the lower court
found the employer liable but did not return a verdict against the employee. On
appeal the court stated: "The fact that the personal liability of the employees was
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The plaintiff in the instant case sought to hold the company
liable on two grounds, respondeat superior and negligent control
of persons on property adjacent to the highway. The facts sug-
gest another interesting problem. One of the basic theories of
tort law is that one will be subject to liability if he creates a
foreseeable risk of harm to others. However, it has been uni-
formly held, in cases involving the giving of liquor, that even if
it is clear that in the particular case the giving of liquor creates
a foreseeable risk of harm to others still there is no liability.
1 7 It
is suggested that the reluctance of the courts to impose liability
based on the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm to others
in these cases is due to the administrative problem of handling
the amount of litigation which might arise as a result. However,
in cases such as the instant case where the defendant is already
under a duty to use reasonable care to protect one person from
harm by another person and the giving of liquor to the other
person creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the person owed
the duty of protection, the giving of liquor might be considered
as a breach of the duty to use reasonable care to protect. Since
the giving of liquor would be considered only a breach of the pre-
existing duty to protect by controlling the conduct of others, the
number of cases coming within the rule would be greatly de-
creased. However, at the present time the courts have not recog-
nized such liability.
C. A. King II
not declared by way of individual judgments against them, for some unexplained
reason, should not and does not vitiate the declaration of the employer's responsi-
bility." 18 N.J. at 461, 114 A.2d at 270. See also Dunbaden v. Castles, 103 N.J.L.
427, 135 At. 886 (1927).
17. State e rel. Joice v. Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. App. 1951)
("Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against the seller
of liquors, as such, for causing intoxication of the person, whose negligence or
wilful wrong has caused injury." The court states that the fact that statutes are
passed creating such liability is evidence of the fact that none existed before) ; 'Pal-
dulo v. Schneider, 346 Ill. App. 454, 456, 105 N.E.2d 115, 116 (1952) ("The In-
herent evils of intoxicating liquors have not enlarged upon the common law duty
of the vendor to his patrons").
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